

High Speed FPGA Implementation of Cryptographic Hash Function

by

Olakunle Esuruoso

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Applied Science at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2011

© 2011 Olakunle Esuruoso

High Speed FPGA Implementation of Cryptographic Hash Function

by

Olakunle Esuruoso

APPROVED BY:

Dr. J. Chen

School of Computer Science

Dr. R. Rashidzadeh

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Dr. H. Wu, Advisor

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Dr. R. Muscedere, Chair of Defense

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

19 September 2011

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone's copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances to my appendix.

I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, a new method for implementing cryptographic hash functions is proposed. This method seeks to improve the speed of the hash function particularly when a large set of messages with similar blocks such as documents with common headers are to be hashed. The method utilizes the peculiar run-time reconfigurability feature of FPGA. Essentially, when a block of message that is commonly hashed is identified, the hash value is stored in memory so that in subsequent occurrences of the message block, the hash value does not need to be recomputed; rather it is simply retrieved from memory, thus giving a significant increase in speed. The system is self-learning and able to dynamically build on its knowledge of frequently occurring message blocks without intervention from the user. The specific hash function to which this technique was applied is Blake, one of the SHA-3 finalists.

DEDICATION

To my beloved family, for their support.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Huapeng Wu, for his guidance and support for this research work. I would also like to thank Dr. Rashid Rashidzadeh and Dr. Jessica Chen for their valuable feedback.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
DEDICATION	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	vi
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Cryptographic hash functions	1
1.2 Applications of hash functions	4
1.3 Problem statement.....	7
1.4 Literature review	8
1.5 Proposed work	8
1.6 Thesis outline	9
2. Background.....	10
2.1 Current hash functions	10
2.2 Blake hash function	11
2.2.1 Message padding.....	15
2.2.2 Counter.....	16
2.2.3 State initialization	17
2.2.4 State update	18
2.2.5 G-function.....	19
2.2.6 Finalization	22
2.3 Implementations of Blake.....	23
3. Previous works on high-speed implementation of Blake.....	25

3.1	Parallelism.....	25
3.2	Pipelining.....	26
3.3	Fast adders.....	27
4.	Proposed design.....	29
4.1	Message preprocessor.....	31
4.2	Memory.....	32
4.3	Decoder.....	33
4.4	System.....	36
5.	Implementation and results	41
5.1	Hardware implementation.....	41
5.2	Software implementation.....	43
5.3	Testing procedure.....	43
5.4	Results.....	45
6.	Conclusion and future work	49
6.1	Conclusion.....	49
6.2	Future work.....	49
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	50
	VITA AUCTORIS.....	54

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Permutation table (σ_{rc})	21
Table 2	Blake constants	22
Table 3	Finalization	22
Table 4	Blake's Initialization Vector (IV)	23
Table 5	Sample decoder truth table.....	35
Table 6	Results (1)	45
Table 7	Results (2)	46

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Top level diagram of Blake	12
Figure 2	State initialization	17
Figure 3	State update: columns and diagonals	19
Figure 4	G-function	20
Figure 5	Pipelining applied to Blake	27
Figure 6	Fast adders	28
Figure 7	Message preprocessor	31
Figure 8	Memory.....	33
Figure 9	Decoder	34
Figure 10	System block diagram	36
Figure 11	Details of some system interconnections	37
Figure 12	ASM chart for controller unit of Blake	38
Figure 13	Illustration of FIN state implementation in Blake controller unit	39
Figure 14	Time to hash versus # of common blocks k in original and proposed designs.....	47
Figure 15	Time to hash versus # of messages k with 1 common block per message	47
Figure 16	Time to hash versus # of messages k with 5 common blocks per message.....	48
Figure 17	Time to hash versus # of messages k with 9 common blocks per message.....	48

CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction

1.1 Cryptographic hash functions

There is no doubt about the fact that electronic communication has revolutionized our world. The world has progressed from communication with mainly letters written on paper and sent through the post office to instant communication via email, chat and social networking websites like Facebook and Google+. Many communication activities that were traditionally done via post are now done through electronic means. These activities include transferring documents, images, audio and video.

Communication needs to be secure to avoid fraudulent activities, such as impersonation. Documents created by an institution such as transcripts can be digitally signed; images created by a camera can be digitally watermarked, all in an effort to ensure secure communication. Many schemes come into play when we are trying to provide information security. These schemes, such as digital signatures and digital watermarking, utilize a number of cryptographic primitives. Cryptographic hash functions are primitives or building blocks utilized in the schemes that are used to provide information security. The cryptographic hash functions on their own do not typically provide full information security; however, they play a critical role in the schemes that do provide information security. Hence the security and speed of the cryptographic hash function can significantly impact the overall security and computational efficiency of an information security scheme.

A cryptographic hash function is one which converts an input data of arbitrary length into a fixed-length output. Cryptographic hash functions are somewhat different from ordinary hash functions used in computer programs; however, for simplicity cryptographic hash functions will simply be referred to as hash functions throughout the rest of this thesis. The output of a hash function must have certain properties; these are: pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance and collision resistance. These properties ensure that the hash function is secure. The properties stem from the ways in which hash functions have been attacked. Pre-image resistance implies that the hash function is a one-way function. That is, it should be infeasible for an attacker to determine the original data (or message) from a given hash code or digest (the digest is another name for the hash code or hash value). Second pre-image resistance guarantees that even the slightest change in a message will change the digest. That is, if an attacker is given a message, it should be infeasible for the attacker to manipulate the message and still obtain the same digest as the original message digest. Collision resistance gives the general analogy of fingerprint with respect to the message digests. That is, every message is expected to have a unique hash code and it should be generally difficult for an attacker to find two messages with the same hash code.

Mathematically, a hash function (H) is defined as follows:

$$H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

In this notation, $\{0, 1\}^*$ refers to the set of binary elements of any length including the empty string while $\{0, 1\}^n$ refers to the set of binary elements of length n. Thus, the hash function maps a set of binary elements of arbitrary length to a set of binary elements of fixed length. Similarly, the properties of a hash function are defined as follows:

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^*; y \in \{0, 1\}^n$$

1. Pre-image resistance: given $y = H(x)$, it should be difficult to find x.

2. Second pre-image resistance: given x , it should be difficult to find x' such that $H(x) = H(x')$ (where $x \neq x'$).
3. Collision resistance: it should be hard to find any pair of x and x' (with $x \neq x'$) such that $H(x) = H(x')$

The properties of second pre-image resistance and collision resistance may seem similar but the difference is that in the case of second pre-image resistance, the attacker is given a message (x) to start with, but for collision resistance no message is given; it is simply up to the attacker to find any two messages that yield the same hash value. The word “difficult” or the phrase “hard to find” in this context implies that it will take a long time (many years) and a huge amount of memory for a computer to perform the computation. That is, for example, it will take many years and a lot of memory for a computer with today’s technology standards to compute a message from its digest value; thus, the computation is regarded as infeasible. It is interesting to note that as processing power of computers have increased over the decades, some hash functions that were previously considered secure (possessing all the properties of pre-image, second pre-image and collision resistance) are now considered “broken”. Also, if an attacker is able to prove that the time it will take to ‘break’ a hash function, though not small has been significantly reduced, that hash function will be considered weak. As computational power increased and cryptanalysis of hash functions were performed, certain hash function standards have also been revised because they were found to be weak. It is desirable to have a hash function that is secure and computationally efficient.

In practise, the length of the input message to a hash function is not arbitrary, but it has a maximum value. However, compared to the length of the resulting hash code, the length of the input message may be considered arbitrary. A hash function operates by first breaking down a message into blocks of a fixed size (unless the entire message is smaller than or equal to the

block size). In this breaking down process, the message is usually “padded” so as to make it fit into a whole number of blocks without any ‘remainder’ or leftover bits. The block size (that is, the number of bits contained within a block) depends on the hash function. Padding a message consists of adding a certain number of zeros and ones to the end of the message. The padding also typically involves embedding the length of the message within the padding bits; other information may also be embedded within the padding bits depending on the hash function. With the message padded and broken down into blocks, the hash function operates on it in an iterative manner. The first message block is inputted to the hash function and the corresponding hash code obtained. The second message block is then inputted along with the hash code of the first block. Thus, the hash output from the first message block is called a chain or intermediate value and it is fed back to the input of the hash function as the initial value for the compression of the second message block. The initial value utilized for the compression of the first message block is a constant for a particular hash function and it is often called the ‘initialization vector’. The hash value obtained when the last message block is compressed is then taken as the hash code (or digest) of the message.

1.2 Applications of hash functions

As mentioned earlier, hash functions are used in certain information security schemes. These include: digital signatures, Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and digital image watermarking. There are also simple applications of hash functions such as password storage. In password storage application, the password entered by a user at the first log-in is not stored in the computer system; rather the hash of the password is stored. To log into the system at subsequent times, the user needs to enter the password; the system hashes it and compares it with the stored hash. If there is a match, the user is granted access to the system otherwise the

user is denied access. The advantage of this scheme lies in the fact that if an attacker manages to gain access to the system's storage devices, only the hash of the password can be retrieved and this cannot be used to recover the original password since the hash function is a one-way function.

In digital signatures, hash functions are used to improve the efficiency (speed) and reduce the bandwidth of the scheme. The digital signature provides a means of demonstrating the authenticity of a message. It relies on the use of asymmetric keys for encryption/decryption. If party A encrypts a message with a private key, the only key that can decrypt that message is A's public key. Conversely, if a message is successfully decrypted with A's public key, it implies that the message could only have been encrypted with A's private key or in other words - the message originated from A. The process of encrypting the message with A's private key is known as (digitally) signing the message. However, in practise, the message itself is not signed, rather the digest (hash value) of the message is computed and that digest is signed. The advantage in doing this is that first of all, the digest is of a fixed length, so the input to the asymmetric encryption unit is always of a fixed known length, irrespective of the size of the original message. Thus, we can say the bandwidth of the input is fixed and reduced from what it would have been if the message itself was signed. Secondly, the process of encryption with an asymmetric key is computationally intensive; thus the smaller the size the input, the faster the operation.

A Message Authentication Code (MAC) can be used to verify that a received message is identical to the one that was sent. That is, it can be used to verify that a message has not been corrupted or manipulated in transit. However, it cannot be used to verify the identity of the sender to a third party because the MAC can be computed by either the sender or the recipient. A MAC is computed with a keyed- hash function. A keyed-hash function is one whose input

includes a key in addition to the message. The success of the operation relies on the secrecy of the key. The sender and recipient must use the same key, yet the key must be kept secret from third parties. To generate a MAC, the sender inputs the message and key to the hash function (along with any applicable constant strings) in a manner specified by an algorithm such as HMAC [1] or UMAC [2]. The generated MAC and message are then sent to the receiver. To verify that the message has not been manipulated, the receiver also generates a MAC of the message using the same hash function and algorithm. If the MAC generated by the receiver is the same as the MAC received from the sender, then the receiver reckons that indeed the message has not been manipulated. The scheme provides an easy way to verify the integrity of a message. For efficiency in computing MACs by both the sender and the receiver, the hash function needs to be able to operate at high speed and in a computationally efficient manner

Another important application of hash functions is found in digital image watermarking. Digital image watermarking is the process of embedding information (known as a watermark) into a digital image. This serves the purpose of facilitating the detection of image manipulation. The original structure of the watermark utilized by a sender is expected to be known by the recipient. If the watermarked image is manipulated, the watermark is also affected; hence when a recipient extracts the watermark, it will be different from that which is expected. It is a clever means of providing information security in situations where the information is an image. Hash functions are utilized in the watermarking algorithms; a common example is the Wong's watermarking algorithm [3]. In Wong's algorithm, the image is divided into blocks of pixels and each block is hashed independently. This is done when embedding the watermark and also when extracting it for verification purposes. When embedding the watermark, the hash output is truncated to a desired size and then it is XORed with a binary watermark to give the output that will be encrypted and placed in the corresponding least significant bit positions of the pixels

of the image. Since the image can contain many blocks of pixels, it is imperative for the hash function to be able to operate at high speed and in a computationally efficient manner.

1.3 Problem statement

Hash functions, as previously established, are very useful in information security schemes. Apart from the above mentioned applications (digital signatures, digital image watermarking and so on), hash functions are also utilized in generating pseudo random numbers which are in turn utilized in many cryptographic schemes. In most of these applications, particularly digital signatures, digital image watermarking and Message Authentication Codes, it is desirable to have the hash function operate as fast as possible especially when a huge traffic or load of messages are expected to be operated on. Consequently, a lot of research effort has been expended in the area of high speed implementation of standardized or widely used hash functions. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has organized a competition to select a new hash function standard that is expected to be atleast as secure as and significantly faster than the current hash function standard (SHA-2). This is in line with the objective of making the hash function run faster and increase overall performance when it is utilized along with other primitives in information security schemes. The goal of this thesis is to explore the high speed implementation of hash functions using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and the Blake hash function (one of the final round candidates in the competition organized by NIST).

1.4 Literature review

As previously mentioned, a significant amount of research effort has been expended in the area of high speed implementation of hash functions. The Blake hash function like many other hash functions was designed with the intent of making it capable of running at high speed. It has a relatively simple algorithm; its compression function is a modified “double round” version of Bernstein’s stream cipher “chacha” which has been intensively analyzed and found to be of excellent performance and parallelizable [4]. Blake has been examined by researchers seeking ways of providing high speed operation. One of the techniques for speed optimization of Blake that is found in literature is parallelism [5]. Other speed optimization techniques that have been applied to Blake are pipelining (in an area of the algorithm where pipelining is feasible) [6] and the use of carry-save adders [6] in the compression function. These techniques focus on the main ‘core’ of the hash function. Nowhere, to the best of our knowledge has any attempt been made to improve the speed of the hash function by looking at the iterative/ repetitive process of hashing.

1.5 Proposed work

Having examined the speed optimizations that have been applied to Blake in literature, we noted that these optimizations only affect the core of the hash function and do not take into consideration the iterative or repetitive process of hashing. The iterative/ repetitive process of hashing as mentioned here, refers to the process by which a message is broken down into blocks and each block is compressed in turn until the final hash code (digest of the message) is produced. In this process, it is possible for redundant computations to occur. This happens when the same message block is compressed more than once. For example, when two messages are

to be hashed in a digital signature scheme, if the first block of both messages is identical, then the hash function is going to repeat the same computation twice when it is compressing these blocks. Each compression takes a number of rounds or in other words, a number of clock cycles. In Blake-256 (the typical implementation of Blake which gives a 256 bit digest), each compression requires 14 clock cycles. If a thousand messages with the same initial message block are to be hashed in an information security scheme and these redundant computations can be somehow avoided, this gives rise to a savings of $1,000 \times 14 = 14,000$ clock cycles. This gives rise to a remarkable increase in speed. This work seeks to provide a means of recognizing and eliminating such redundant computations that may be encountered when hashing messages and by so doing, improve the speed and computational efficiency of the hash function.

1.6 Thesis outline

The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 introduces and explains the concepts of operation of the Blake hash function, which are necessary for a proper understanding of both previous and current research works. Chapter 3 describes the speed optimizations that have been applied to Blake in literature. Chapter 4 explains our new proposed architecture which provides additional speed optimization for the Blake hash function. Chapter 5 presents the implementation of the proposed architecture and the results obtained. Finally, chapter 6 presents concluding remarks and recommendations for future work.

CHAPTER 2

2. Background

2.1 Current hash functions

The hash functions in use today evolved from weaknesses found in previous hash functions. The first publicly known hash function was developed by Ronald Rivest in 1989 and it was known as Message-Digest Algorithm (MD2). In 1990, Rivest developed another hash algorithm named MD4. MD4 was based on the Merkle-Damgard construction [7]. In 1991, Rivest again developed another hash algorithm to replace MD4; this new algorithm was named MD5. Meanwhile the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was also working on a hash function standard. In 1993, NIST developed the Secure Hash Standard (SHA). This standard was published by NIST as a US Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). However, shortly after the publication, the algorithm was withdrawn due to an undisclosed "significant flaw". It was replaced by a revised version named SHA-1. SHA-1 has been widely used in information security schemes such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Secure Shell (SSH) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). SHA-2, a set of hash functions (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512) was designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and published by NIST in 2001. These hash functions in SHA-2 are named according to the number of bits of their digest; SHA-256 for instance has 256 bits in its digest. SHA-2 was created as an update to the former standard (SHA-1).

Many of the hash functions mentioned above have either been broken or weaknesses have been found in them. MD2, MD4 and MD5 have all been broken [8]. Collisions have been

found for SHA-0 [9] and some cryptographers have found algorithms that produce SHA-1 collisions in fewer than the expected number of evaluations [10]. This implies that SHA-1 is weak. SHA-2 has some similarities to SHA-1 and since some weakness had already been found in SHA-1, NIST decided to update the hash standard to a new standard which will be called SHA-3. SHA-3 will not be derived from SHA-2; instead, NIST organised a competition in 2007 in which anybody is free to submit candidate hash algorithms for the SHA-3. A "Draft requirements and evaluation criteria of the SHA-3 algorithm" was published for public comment and the evaluation criteria was updated by NIST based on public feedback. The competition started off with 64 candidate submissions. Of the 64 submissions, NIST accepted 51 for the first round of evaluations. The first round candidates were posted online at the NIST website for public review; NIST also had its own internal review team. In 2009, based on public feedback and internal reviews, the list of 51 candidates was reduced to 14 candidates for the second round of the competition. After the second round of evaluations, the list of candidates was further reduced to 5 for the final round. These five candidates are Blake, Groestl, Keccak, JH, Skein.


We selected the Blake hash function, one of the SHA-3 finalists, for this work on speed optimization of hash function due to its public recognition as a secure and efficient hash function. A description of the algorithm of Blake is provided in the following section.

2.2 Blake hash function

The Blake hash function [4] is a SHA-3 proposal submitted to NIST by Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Luca Henzen, Willi Meier and Raphael C.-W. Phan. The original submission was made in October 2008 and a revision with some tweaks for the final round of the SHA-3 competition was submitted in January 2011. The names of the tweaked versions of the hash function were changed from BLAKE-28, BLAKE-32, BLAKE-48, BLAKE-64 to BLAKE-224, BLAKE-256, BLAKE-384

and BLAKE-512 respectively. These new names indicate the digest sizes for the various versions of the Blake hash function. These digest sizes are the same as those of SHA-2 making it easy to directly substitute Blake in applications utilizing SHA-2. The tweaks made on the original submission were the change of the recommended number of rounds for BLAKE-224, BLAKE-256 to 14 (instead of 10) and the change of the recommended number of rounds for BLAKE-384, BLAKE-512 to 16 (instead of 14).

A top-level diagram of Blake-256 with its inputs and outputs is shown in figure 1 below (when we make reference to the Blake hash function, we normally refer to its core functionality alone as depicted in figure 1; that is the unit that hashes only individual message blocks). The main input to the hash function is the message block input and the main output is the digest (or hash value). The message block input takes in a 512-bit message block which may represent text, image pixels or any kind of information. There are other inputs (salt and counter), one of which is optional.



Input	Description
Message block	A 512-bit block of the message to be hashed
Salt	Optional input; used to introduce randomness
Counter	Sum of bits in present and previous message blocks

Figure 1 Top level diagram of Blake

The salt input is an optional input that the user may utilize to introduce a user-controlled parameter to compression of each message block. The salt is useful for randomized hashing. If the salt is not used, its value is simply set to 0. For this work of speed optimization, we will not make use of the salt. The counter input adds an extra security layer to the hash function. We shall take a closer look at the counter in a later section.

The designers of Blake did not re-invent the wheel; rather they put together components which had been previously analyzed and found to be secure and effective to form Blake. Blake works in an iterative manner just as most hash functions do; that is, the hash code of the previous message block is fed back to the input of the hash function for the compression of the next message block. However, Blake follows the Hash Iterative Framework (HAIFA) method proposed by Biham and Dunkelman [11] and not the Merkle-Damgard (MD) iteration [7] mode. HAIFA is an improved version of the MD construction. Blake does not follow HAIFA fully, but it borrows from it. The main ideas behind HAIFA are the introduction of the counter, a special initial value (IV) for each digest size and a salt to the input of the compression function. Also the length of the digest is included (in addition to the length of the message) in the padding of the message. The Merkle-Damgard construct only includes the length of the message in the padding. With Blake following the HAIFA iteration mode, it is able to provide resistance to certain attacks that the MD construct could not adequately prevent such as length-extension.

Blake's internal structure is called a local-wide pipe structure [4]. The wide pipe construction [12] is a type of structure in which the internal state of the hash function (from which the hash value is extracted) is much larger (in number of bits) than the hash value. The local-wide pipe was inspired by the wide-pipe structure; in local-wide pipe, the large internal state is initialized from an initial value (or chain value), a salt and a counter. The advantage of the local-wide pipe structure is that it makes 'local' collisions impossible. Blake's compression

function borrows heavily from Daniel J Bernstein's stream cipher named "chacha". Bernstein, a professor of mathematics at the University of Illinois at Chicago also submitted a SHA-3 candidate known as Cubehash to NIST, but Cubehash was eliminated in the second round of the competition. Blake's compression function is actually a modified 'double round' of chacha [4]. It's a modified version because the designers of Blake added the input of a message word and a constant to the original chacha function. Chacha had been previously analyzed by Aumasson (one of the designers of Blake). From his analysis, Aumasson became convinced of the remarkable simplicity and security of chacha, leading to the adoption of chacha in Blake. Chacha was designed to be immune to all kinds of side-channel attacks and Blake automatically inherited this property. Side channel attacks are attacks which do not attack the compression function but attack its implementation on systems which leak data (such as timing and power analysis information). For example, the power consumption trace of a program running in a microcontroller is full of information. Chacha's performance was found to be excellent during the analysis and it was found to be strongly parallelizable. Again, Blake inherited these properties and this makes it an efficient hash function.

The first step in hashing a message with Blake is to pad the message and break it into blocks of 512 bits. The details of the padding are explained in the next section. The block size of Blake-256 is 512 bits but the word size is 32 bits; thus each message block contains 16 words. Blake's algorithm initializes an internal state from the initial (or chain) value and other input(s) (salt, counter) and then updates this internal state in a number of rounds by performing computations on the state in each round using pieces (words) of the message block and some constants. The salt input, when not used is set to 0; thus it acts as a constant for the initialization of the internal state. After the rounds of state update have been all been completed, a finalization process is performed which extracts the hash code from the internal state. This hash

code could be the digest for the message or it could simply be an intermediate or chain value which will be used as the initial value for the initialization of the internal state for the next message block. However, if message block being processed is the last message block of the message, then the hash value obtained at the finalization stage is the digest of the message.

2.2.1 Message padding

A message is padded before hashing it for a number of reasons; first of all, the message is padded so that it can be divided into an integral number of blocks. For example, if a message has 592 bits, without padding the first 512 bits of the message can be placed in a block but then 80 bits are left 'hanging'. To solve this kind of problem, the message is padded to make it a 1024 bit message. Now it can be divided into 2 blocks. Padding is done by appending a number of zero and one bits at the end of the message. Padding is also done to embed certain properties of the message into the last message block. This enhances the security of the hash function against certain types of attacks. In Blake, a message (M) is padded by first extending its length, $|M|$, such that $|M| = 447 \bmod 512$. In effect, this means the remainder when $|M|$ is divided by 512 is 447. This length extension is done by appending a '1' bit to the end of the message followed by a sufficient number of '0' bits. Having achieved length extension, the size of the digest and length of the message are then embedded into the message. $512 - 447 = 65$; 64 bits are used to embed the length of the message while 1 bit is used to embed the size of the digest. The digest size is set to 1 for Blake-256, Blake-512 and set to 0 for Blake-224, Blake 384. Thus the padding operation can be summarized as

$$M \leftarrow M \parallel 00000\dots \parallel |d| \parallel |M|$$

where $|d|$ is the digest size, $|M|$ is the length of the original (unpadded) message; and ' \parallel ' represents concatenation.

2.2.2 Counter

The counter is an input that springs from the HAIFA iteration mode specification. Most of the recent proposals on the way compression functions are to be iterated such as randomized hashing and the enveloped Merkle-Damgard construction can all be instantiated as part of HAIFA. The counter represents the sum of the number of message bits that have been hashed so far and the number of message bits in the current block to be hashed. HAIFA makes the compression of each block a function of the counter. That is $h_i = C(h_{i-1}, m_i, \#bits, salt)$ where '#bits' is the counter. This provides extra security against fixed-point attacks. A fixed-point is an initial value and message block pair (h, m) which when inputted to the hash function (H) gives $H(h, m) = h$. That is the hash code computed for an initial value and a message block is the same as the initial value. A collision may be obtained if a fixed-point is found because m and $m\&m$ will give the same hash code. With the inclusion of the counter as an input for each message, the attacker is forced to work harder in order to find a fixed-point. Moreover, even if a fixed-point of the form $(h, m, \#bits, salt)$ is found, so that $h = C(h, m, \#bits, salt)$, the attacker cannot concatenate m to itself and still get the same hash code because the counter ($\#bits$) would be different for m and $m\&m$. The following example illustrates how the counter value for each message block in the Blake hash function is determined: suppose we have a message with 1020 bits. After padding, this will be broken into 3 blocks of 512, 508 and 0 message bits. The term 'message bits' is important because in the second and third blocks there will be some padding bits, but since we are only considering message bits, we do not consider these. Thus, the counter value for the first block is 512; for the second block it is $512+508 = 1020$. For the third block, following the definition, we ought to have the counter value also set to 1020; however, whenever a block contains only padding bits without any message bits, the counter value is set

to 0 (irrespective of the number of bits that were previously hashed). Thus, for the third block in our example, the counter value is set to 0.

2.2.3 State initialization

The internal state of Blake has a local-wide pipe structure. The state is a 4x4 matrix of 32 bit state variables. Thus the state has 16 32-bit variables (or words). The internal state is a core component of the Blake hash function. The inputs (apart from the message block) are used to initialize the state; or in other words to determine the initial value of the state variables. The initialization of some state variables is done by simply assigning the corresponding value of the initial or chain value to the state variables. For some other state variables, the initialization is

Internal State (V)

$V_0 = h_{00}$	$V_1 = h_{01}$	$V_2 = h_{02}$	$V_3 = h_{03}$
$V_4 = h_{04}$	$V_5 = h_{05}$	$V_6 = h_{06}$	$V_7 = h_{07}$
$V_8 = s_0 \wedge c_0$	$V_9 = s_1 \wedge c_1$	$V_{10} = s_2 \wedge c_2$	$V_{11} = s_3 \wedge c_3$
$V_{12} = t_0 \wedge c_4$	$V_{13} = t_0 \wedge c_5$	$V_{14} = t_1 \wedge c_6$	$V_{15} = t_1 \wedge c_7$

Figure 2 State initialization

done by first XORing a word of the salt and a constant or XORing a word of the counter and a constant and then assigning the result to the state variable. Figure 2 illustrates the state initialization for all the state variables. In figure 2, V_i represents a state variable; h_{oi} represents a word of the initial or chain value; s_i represents a word of the salt; c_i represents a constant word and t_i represents a word of the counter.

2.2.4 State update

The algorithm of Blake updates the internal state once it has been initialized; this is done by performing some operations on the state. These operations performed on the state change the values of the state variables. The state update utilizes words of the message block and it is performed by a compression function. Essentially the state update involves operations like addition, rotations, XOR. The compression function of Blake which performs these operations is called the g-function. The state is updated in a number of rounds. Each round consists of some operations performed by the g-function on the state to update it. Since the state is a 4x4 matrix; it has 4 rows and 4 columns. Each round of a state update can be broken down into the update of the state's columns and diagonals. These columns and diagonals of the state are indicated by their distinct colours in figure 3. The state columns are first updated starting from the first column on the left as indicated by the index of the g-function in the figure. After all the columns have been updated, the four diagonals are updated in order. In Blake-256, a full or complete state update consists of 14 rounds of state update. Since each round typically takes one clock cycle, the full state update takes 14 clock cycles. A g-function operation on a state column or diagonal utilizes 2 message words. Thus, each round of state update utilizes 16 message words (or 512 bits); in order words, each round of state update utilizes the entire message block.




Figure 3 State update: columns and diagonals

2.2.5 G-function

The g-function has the following inputs: 4 state variables, 2 message words and 2 constant words. It has 4 outputs which are same 4 inputted state variables. At the active clock edge, new values are assigned to the state variables are stored; figure 4 illustrates this. The g-function performs operations such as addition, rotation and XOR on the state variables. The specific operations performed by the g-function depends on the column or diagonal of the state that it is acting on (represented by the 'i' subscript of the g-function) and the round number (represented by 'r' subscript of σ) as given below.

$G_i(V_{x1}, V_{x2}, V_{x3}, V_{x4})$ at round, r , is evaluated as

$$v_{x1} = v_{x1} + v_{x2} + (m\sigma_r(2i) \wedge C\sigma_r(2i+1))$$

$$v_{x4} = (v_{x4} \wedge v_{x1}) \ggg 16$$

$$v_{x3} = v_{x3} + v_{x4}$$

$$v_{x2} = (v_{x2} \wedge v_{x3}) \ggg 12$$

$$v_{x1} = v_{x1} + v_{x2} + (m\sigma_r(2i+1) \wedge C\sigma_r(2i))$$

$$v_{x4} = (v_{x4} \wedge v_{x1}) \ggg 8$$

$$v_{x3} = v_{x3} + v_{x4}$$

$$v_{x2} = (v_{x2} \wedge v_{x3}) \ggg 7$$

In the operations described above, ' \ggg ' represents a rotation to the left and ' \wedge ' represents a bitwise XOR operation. $V_{x1}, V_{x2}, V_{x3}, V_{x4}$ are state variables. From figure 3, the state column or diagonal denoted by the subscript i in the notation G_i is evident. The message words (m) and constants (c) utilized during a g -function computation are determined by a permutation table named σ .




Figure 4 G-function

The permutation table σ can be visualized as a 2-dimensional array of integers. The first array index specifies the row of the table, while the second array index specifies the column of the table. The permutation table is displayed in table 1. The message block is also internally represented as an array of message words $m(0)$ to $m(15)$; similarly, the constants employed in the g -function are represented as an array of constant words $c(0)$ to $c(15)$. The notation $m_{\sigma_r(2i)}$ represents a message word whose array index is determined by the permutation $\sigma_r(2i)$. For example, if the current round of the state update, $r = 2$ and the second column of the state is being updated ($i = 1$) then $\sigma_r(2i) = \sigma_{22}$; from permutation table this gives a value of 12. Thus, $m_{\sigma_r(2i)} = m(12)$.

r\c	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	14	10	4	8	9	15	13	6	1	12	0	2	11	7	5	3
2	11	8	12	0	5	2	15	13	10	14	3	6	7	1	9	4
3	7	9	3	1	13	12	11	14	2	6	5	10	4	0	15	8
4	9	0	5	7	2	4	10	15	14	1	11	12	6	8	3	13
5	2	12	6	10	0	11	8	3	4	13	7	5	15	14	1	9
6	12	5	1	15	14	13	4	10	0	7	6	3	9	2	8	11
7	13	11	7	14	12	1	3	9	5	0	15	4	8	6	2	10
8	6	15	14	9	11	3	0	8	12	2	13	7	1	4	10	5
9	10	2	8	4	7	6	1	5	15	11	9	14	3	12	13	0
10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
11	14	10	4	8	9	15	13	6	1	12	0	2	11	7	5	3
12	11	8	12	0	5	2	15	13	10	14	3	6	7	1	9	4
13	7	9	3	1	13	12	11	14	2	6	5	10	4	0	15	8

Table 1 Permutation table (σ_{rc})

The constants utilized in the g-function (such as $C\sigma_r(2i)$) are determined in a similar manner. The array of 16 constants is given in table 2 below:

$c0 = 243F6A88$	$c1 = 85A308D3$	$c2 = 13198A2E$	$c3 = 03707344$
$c4 = A4093822$	$c5 = 299F31D0$	$c6 = 082EFA98$	$c7 = EC4E6C89$
$c8 = 452821E6$	$c9 = 38D01377$	$c10 = BE5466CF$	$c11 = 34E90C6C$
$c12 = C0AC29B7$	$c13 = C97C50DD$	$c14 = 3F84D5B5$	$c15 = B5470917$

Table 2 Blake constants

2.2.6 Finalization

The finalization stage is the last process in the computation of the hash value of a message block. This hash value (or code) may be a chain value or the digest of the message. In this stage, the hash value is extracted from the updated state. The salt (s) and initial value (h_{i-1}) which were used to initialize the state are again used in the extraction of the hash code, but the counter is not used.

$h'_0 = h_0 \wedge s_0 \wedge v_0 \wedge v_8$	$h'_1 = h_1 \wedge s_1 \wedge v_1 \wedge v_9$	$h'_2 = h_0 \wedge s_2 \wedge v_2 \wedge v_{10}$
$h'_4 = h_4 \wedge s_0 \wedge v_4 \wedge v_{12}$	$h'_5 = h_5 \wedge s_1 \wedge v_5 \wedge v_{13}$	$h'_3 = h_3 \wedge s_3 \wedge v_3 \wedge v_{11}$
$h'_6 = h_6 \wedge s_2 \wedge v_6 \wedge v_{14}$	$h'_7 = h_7 \wedge s_3 \wedge v_7 \wedge v_{15}$	

Table 3 Finalization

As previously mentioned, when the salt input is not used, its value is set to 0 and it simply functions as a constant. Essentially, a set of XOR operations are performed using the initial value, salt and 2 state variables as shown in table 3 in this stage. Table 4 gives the initial values used for the first block of a message (referred to as the initialization vector) in both the state initialization and the finalization processes. It may be recalled from previous discussions that for subsequent message blocks the initial value is given by the hash code (chain value) of the previous message block.

$IV_0 = 6A09E667F3BCC908$	$IV_1 = BB67AE8584CAA73B$
$IV_2 = 3C6EF372FE94F82B$	$IV_3 = A54FF53A5F1D36F1$
$IV_4 = 510E527FADE682D1$	$IV_5 = 9B05688C2B3E6C1F$
$IV_6 = 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B$	$IV_7 = 5BE0CD19137E2179$

Table 4 Blake’s Initialization Vector (IV)

2.3 Implementations of Blake

Blake has already been implemented on a wide variety of platforms. These include software implementations using C, Python, Matlab; hardware implementations with Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and FPGA. In FPGA, Blake has been implemented on devices from the two main FPGA vendors (Altera and Xilinx). In these platforms there have been efforts to optimize the speed of operation of the hash function since this has huge advantages particularly when hashing a large amount of messages in the various information security schemes. Hardware implementations generally operate faster than software implementations.

In the next chapter we shall examine the speed optimizations that have already been done in hardware.

CHAPTER 3

3. Previous works on high-speed implementation of Blake

Certain techniques have been applied to hardware implementations of Blake in an attempt to optimize the speed of the hash function. These techniques are: parallelism, pipelining and the use of fast adders. In the following sections we shall examine each of these techniques.

3.1 Parallelism

Parallelism [5] is one of the methods that have been applied for the speed optimization of Blake. The main task that consumes time in the hash function's algorithm is the state update. The initialization is a process that simply depends on a few XOR gates and combinational logic; this doesn't consume time. Similarly, the finalization is a process that depends on XOR gates and utilizes only combinational logic; it consumes a relatively small amount of time. However, for the state update; first of all it utilizes the g-functions which have addition, rotation operations; these can consume some time. Secondly, the full state update takes 14 rounds of similar g-function operations. Thus, if the speed of the hash function is to be increased, one of the main areas to consider would be the state update. The update of the state columns and diagonals can be done sequentially; that is, one column (or diagonal) updated at a time or it could be done with all 4 columns updated simultaneously. However, all the columns must be updated before the diagonals are updated because the diagonal update makes use of the new state variable values obtained from the column update. Parallelism is applied to Blake by updating all the columns of the state simultaneously and then similarly updating all the diagonals of the state

simultaneously. This requires at least 4 g-functions; alternatively 8 g-functions may be used, however the last four g-functions will be dependent on the first 4 g-functions for their inputs in this case. The speed of the hash function is improved by a factor of 4 through parallelism.

3.2 Pipelining

In the g-function, some of the operations performed could take a relatively long period of time. The g-function is a modified 'double' round of the stream cipher chacha. The fact that it is a double round implies that the outputs of some operations in the g-function are inputs to some other operations in the same g-function. In particular, computations involving the XOR of message and constant words, one of which is given below:

$$v_{x1} = v_{x1} + v_{x2} + (m\sigma_r(2i) \wedge C\sigma_r(2i+1))$$

consume a longer time because there are three major operations involved. Thus, these operations constitute the critical path of the g-function (the path with the longest delay). The critical path influences the speed (throughput) of the overall computation. A long critical path delay requires a long the clock period and hence the speed of the hash function is reduced. However, a pipeline stage may be used to improve the speed. Since there are 14 rounds of repeated g-function computations, if a pipeline register is inserted into the critical path of the g-function; thereby creating a two stage pipeline, then the first stage of the pipeline for the next round can be executed while the second stage of the pipeline for the current round is executing. The net effect is an increase in the clock rate and consequently an increase in speed (throughput) of the hash function. This pipeline technique was applied in [6]. Figure 5 illustrates the method.




Figure 5 Pipelining applied to Blake

As seen in figure 5, when pipelining is applied, 3 g-function computations were accomplished within a time period of t_2 ; whereas without pipelining only 2 g-functions were accomplished within the same time period.

3.3 Fast adders

The third technique that has been applied for speed optimization in Blake is the use of carry-save and carry-lookahead adders in the g-function. These are fast adders. The technique was applied in [6]. Carries are a major source of delay in additions when ripple adders are used because a carry needs to propagate to the last full adder before the sum can be considered valid. The additions in the g-function of Blake are 32-bit additions; thus if ripple adders are used, then the time it takes for a carry to propagate from the full adder (FA) at the least significant bit (LSB) position to the full adder at the most significant bit position (MSB) can be significant. To

overcome this source of delay, 2 carry-save adders (CSA) are used when three numbers are to be added, with a carry -lookahead adder (CLA) performing the final stage of the addition. This is shown in figure 6 for a 2 bit number. The CSA is a FA connected in such a way that it adds corresponding bits of the 3 numbers directly similar to the way we add numbers on paper. This saves a significant amount of time since the few carries generated are added with a CLA. The arrangement can be easily extended to 32 bits.




Figure 6 Fast adders

CHAPTER 4

4. Proposed design

The speed optimizations techniques discussed in the previous chapter essentially focus on the process of hashing one message block. These techniques are effective and aim at reducing the time spent in hashing each message block, thereby reducing the overall time spent in hashing a message which may contain many blocks. For example, if the time spent in hashing a message block has been reduced through the use of fast adders from 50ns to 45ns and there are 1000 messages to be hashed, each containing 10 message blocks; the minimum time that would be spent in hashing these messages would be reduced from 0.5ms to 0.45ms. Thus, the speed has been improved. A similar analogy holds for the techniques of parallelism and pipelining. However, there is a particular situation in which the speed of the hash function can be potentially increased further but these techniques cannot bring about the improvement. This situation occurs when many messages which have some identical message blocks are to be hashed. For instance, if message blocks 1 and 2 out of the 10 message blocks in the messages of our previous example are identical but message blocks 3 to 10 are different, these messages will still give distinct hash codes. However, the chain values (intermediate hash values) obtained for message blocks 1 and 2 will be the same for all the messages. The implication of this, is that in computing the digests of the 1000 messages, the hash function will perform the same computation 2,000 times (the hash code of message block 1 will be computed 1000 times, the same goes for message block 2, so in total there will be 2,000 identical or repeated computations). If there was a way to bypass these repeated computations, this would certainly

lead to a significant increase in speed; the time taken to compute the hash codes would be reduced by an additional 0.1ms.

Our design takes the situation in which messages with common blocks are to be hashed into consideration and provides a way of bypassing the redundant computations that would otherwise have to be made; thus providing high speed operation. The design allows the previously discussed techniques of parallelism, pipelining and fast adders to be applied to the Blake hash function but in addition it provides a method of avoiding redundant computations, thereby leading to a further increase in the speed of the hash function. The design is self-learning; that is, it builds up its knowledge of common message blocks without intervention from the user. The design incorporates three major components to facilitate these:

1. Message preprocessor: This component independently identifies common message blocks in the messages that are being hashed, determines their initial values, counter values and computes their hash codes.
2. Memory: A memory device is used to store the hash code of any common message block that has been identified by the message preprocessor.
3. Decoder: This component is used to determine if an inputted message block is a common message block. If the inputted message block is a common message block, the decoder outputs the address of the memory location containing the hash code of the common message block. In addition, it also outputs a signal which indicates to the hash function unit that the hash code of the inputted message block is already available in memory and consequently, there is no need to compute it.

In the following sections we shall discuss each of these components and how they interconnect to achieve the desired operation.

4.1 Message preprocessor

The message preprocessor is a microprocessor with software running on it to perform the function of identifying any common message blocks within a sequence of messages. It has to be able to run independently; that is it should run concurrently with the hashing of the messages so that it does not delay or disrupt the hashing of the messages. In order to achieve this, the external memory device from which the messages to be hashed are fetched should be a multiport memory device, so that the message preprocessor has an independent access to the messages through one of its ports and the rest of the system also has access to the same messages through another port of the memory.

The preprocessor initializes reconfiguration of the decoder whenever this is required. Figure 7 shows a block diagram of the preprocessor. An example of a preprocessing algorithm would be to place 10 messages occurring in sequence in arrays; with each array element containing a message block. A 3-dimensional array could be used to place the messages into blocks; the first array index representing the message, the second array index representing the message block and the third array index representing the individual bits of a message block. A




Figure 7 Message preprocessor

comparison can then be made between message blocks at corresponding array positions to determine if any of them have identical initial values and identical contents. The term “common message block” refers to a message block that has not only identical content with another (or multiple) message block(s), but also has identical counter and initial values. Thus if message blocks 1, 2 and 4 are identical for 2 messages, we can bypass the computation of the hash codes for message blocks 1 and 2 in the second message by using the results obtained from the first message but we cannot bypass the computation of message block 4 because it will have different initial values for both messages and consequently different hash codes. It should be noted that the counter value for two identical message blocks at the same block position with the same initial value will automatically be the same.

After identifying any common blocks in the messages through comparison, the preprocessor will independently compute the hash codes of the common blocks (a separate hash peripheral will be utilized for this so that the normal hash process of the messages remains undisrupted). These hash codes will then be used to reconfigure the memory device and the corresponding message blocks, initial values and counter values will be used to reconfigure the decoder. The algorithm for these tasks can be written in C (or any other suitable programming language).

4.2 Memory

A memory device is required for storing hash codes of common message blocks that have been identified by the preprocessor. The word size of the memory should be 256 bits in order to accommodate the 256-bit hash codes. However, a large number of memory words is typically not required since only a limited number of hash codes are expected to be stored at any given time. The address input of the memory is connected to the decoder. Figure 8

illustrates the function of the memory device. Hash codes are placed in memory locations through run-time reconfiguration. This reconfiguration is initiated by the preprocessor and carried out by a reconfiguration processor.



Figure 8 Memory

4.3 Decoder

When a message block is to be hashed, there needs to be a way of determining if the block is one of the common blocks that have been identified by the preprocessor and whose hash code has been stored in memory. If the block is one of such common blocks, then the address of the memory location where its hash code has been stored needs to be determined. Furthermore, a signal needs to be sent to the hash function computation unit to inform the unit that no computation needs to be made for that message block and that a valid output signal can be generated since the hash code is already available. In this way the entire 14 rounds of computations that would otherwise be required are skipped. The decoder performs these tasks.

As shown in figure 9, the decoder can be visualized as an m-bit to n-bit code converter. That is, it maps the m-bit codes present at its input to corresponding n-bit output codes. The m-bit code represents the message block concatenated with the initial value and counter value.

Thus, it is an 831-bit code (512 bits for the message, 256 bits for the initial value, and 64 bits for the counter).




Figure 9 Decoder

The n-bit code represents the address of the memory location with the hash code of the message block contained in the input m-bit code, concatenated with a “match” signal. This match signal when activated indicates that a hash code is present in memory for the inputted message block. Thus it can be used to inform the hash function unit to skip computations for that message block.

Essentially, the decoder is created by a truth table with an m-bit input code and n-bit output code. Since we are only concerned with specific m-bit codes corresponding to specific message blocks, initial values and counter values, all other possible m-bit code combinations will be represented by ‘don’t care’ values (X) state in the truth table. Likewise since we want the match signal to be activated only when specific m-bit codes are inputted, the match signal is deactivated (set to 0) for all don’t care inputs; similarly, the memory addresses corresponding to don’t care inputs are assigned don’t care values since they are not utilized in such cases. An example of a truth table which can be used to configure the decoder is given in table 5. All the values stated in the table are represented with hexadecimal numbers.

Message Block [511..0]	Initial Value [255..0]	Counter [63..0]	Address[3..0]	Match
1aef89712137b3dac890 93ef89712137b3dac890 2eaf89712137b3dac890 1a0f59712137b3dac890 5aef89712137b3dac890 33ef69712137b3dac890 47809001	6a09e667bb67ae85 3c6ef372a54ff53a 510e527f9b05688c 1f83d9ab5be0cd19	000000000000 512	1	1
11ea85610197b3decaff0 53e080317139b3dfcfff 2eaf89712137b3dac8ff 1a0f59702137a3dac8ff 5aef89702137a3dac8ff 33ef69702137a3dac8ea 40808001	0ce8d4ef4dd7cd8d 62dfded9d4edb0a7 74ae6a41929a74da 23109e8f11139c87	000000000000 512	2	1
X	X	X	X	0

Table 5 Sample decoder truth table

Arbitrary values can be utilized in the decoder's truth table when the system is implemented. However, as the message processor begins to discover common message blocks, the decoder needs to be reconfigured on the fly so that it can recognize these common message blocks; therefore its truth table needs to be updated at run-time. This is achieved through run-time reconfiguration. The run-time reconfiguration is initiated by the message preprocessor and carried out by a reconfiguration processor. In order for the decoder and memory device to be run-time reconfigurable, they should be implemented in a partially reconfigurable block of the FPGA. All other components of the system should be placed in static blocks within the FPGA.

4.4 System

The overall system consists of all the above mentioned components interconnected to achieve the desired goal. A top-level block diagram of the system is given in figure 10. Figure 11




Figure 10 System block diagram

shows more details of the interconnections between certain of the components of the system.

From figure 11, it is evident that the decoder selects the address of the memory location containing the hash code corresponding to the inputted message block, counter value and initial value. The 'match' signal, which is also generated by the decoder, is used as a select input of a multiplexer. The multiplexer selects the hash code obtained from memory when the match

signal is activated (set to 1); otherwise it selects the hash code obtained from the hash function computation unit.




Figure 11 Details of some system interconnections

The system is self-learning. Initially, it has no knowledge of common message blocks (assuming the decoder is initially configured with arbitrary values), but as messages are hashed, the message preprocessor begins to discover common message blocks. The preprocessor then sends appropriate signals to the reconfiguration processor to reconfigure the decoder and memory using the newly discovered common message blocks and hash codes. Thus, in this manner, the system builds up its knowledge of common message blocks.

From figure 10, we note that the Blake hash function is connected as a peripheral for a processor labelled 'hashing' processor. With this arrangement, the processor serves as an interface between the hash function and the external memory containing messages to be hashed. The Blake hash peripheral only hashes single message blocks, thus in order to hash a message, the hashing processor needs to break down the message into blocks. The hashing processor also applies padding to the messages and applies initial and counter values to the

message blocks. It transfers the message block words along with the associated initial and counter values to the Blake peripheral in a serial manner. The name 'peripheral' here implies a device that is loosely attached to the processor; that is, it has some level of independence from the processor. It can perform multi-cycle operations without interference from the processor. A custom instruction on the other would imply a device that is closely attached to the processor. The hashing processor retrieves the chain value from the Blake peripheral after the hash of the message block has been completed and applies it as the initial value for the next message block. It therefore supervises or conducts the entire hash operation.




Figure 12 ASM chart for controller unit of Blake

As mentioned earlier, the match signal is used to skip computations in the Blake peripheral when a ‘known’ message block is inputted. The mechanism by which this occurs deserves further explanation. Figure 12 shows an algorithm state machine (ASM) chart for the controller unit within the Blake peripheral. The figure shows the ASM chart of the controller for both the original Blake design and the proposed design. Comparison of the two charts shows that the main difference is in the addition of a decision box containing the match signal in the proposed design. This match signal, when activated with the controller in the IDL state, sets the next state as FIN. Thus, at the active clock edge, the controller proceeds to the FIN state, skipping the RND state. The computations of the g-functions occur only when the RND state is activated; thus by skipping the RND state these computations are bypassed. At the FIN state, a ‘data valid’ signal labelled “VALIDOUT” is outputted. This signal indicates that the hash code has been successfully obtained (either by computation or through retrieval from memory). Figure 13 illustrates how the FIN state can be implemented for both the controllers, using one-hot encoding.




Figure 13 Illustration of FIN state implementation in Blake controller unit

In the upper part of figure 13 (original controller unit), the FIN state can only be activated when the ROUND signal (generated in the RND state) reaches a count of 13 (1101_b); this is in accordance with the ASM chart of figure 12. However, in lower part of the figure (proposed controller unit), the FIN state can be activated) through an alternative path: this occurs when the controller is in the IDL state (IDL is activated) and a message block is inputted (VALIDIN is activated) and the message block is a common message block (MATCH is activated).

CHAPTER 5

5. Implementation and results

In this chapter, we will look at how the design was implemented in the FPGA, and then we will examine the tests that were carried out to verify the operation of the system and determine its performance. The performance results obtained are then presented.

5.1 Hardware implementation

The implementation of the system can be divided into hardware implementation and software implementation. Hardware implementation consists of the implementation of the Blake hash peripheral, the decoder, the memory and the multiplexer as shown in figure 11. Hardware implementation also includes the implementation of the hardware components of the hashing processor and the message preprocessor. Software implementation consists of the programs written for both the hashing processor and the message preprocessor. In this section we shall discuss hardware implementation.

Hardware design entry was done using both hardware description language (VHDL) and schematic capture. VHDL was utilized for the design entry of individual components: the Blake peripheral, the decoder, the memory and the multiplexer, while schematic capture (provided in the Quartus II Block Editor tool) was utilized for the interconnection of these components. The hashing processor was built from Altera's Nios II soft-core processor Intellectual Property (IP). The Nios II processor is a 32-bit RISC processor with a harvard architecture. The System On a Programmable Chip (SOPC Builder) tool was used to configure the Nios II processor core and attach useful peripherals such as memory controllers, JTAG UART to it. SOPC Builder was also

used to define the proposed Blake hash function (with the decoder and memory as shown in figure 11) as a (custom) peripheral and attach it to the hashing processor through an appropriate interface. There are numerous interfaces available within the FPGA fabric including Avalon Memory Mapped Master, Avalon Memory Mapped Slave, and conduit interfaces. The Blake peripheral was attached to the hashing processor as an Avalon Memory Mapped Slave. Thus, the processor makes read and write transactions with the Blake peripheral using an address assigned to it in the processor's memory map. The valid output signal (VALIDOUT) of the Blake peripheral was configured as an interrupt (of high priority). When the processor receives the interrupt, an interrupt service routine (ISR) fetches the result (hash code) from the peripheral. The interrupt is generated within a shorter period when a common message block is hashed.

The Cyclone II FPGA on the DE-2 development board was utilized for the implementation of the system. The DE-2 board contains SRAM and SDRAM; these were used as main memory for the hashing processor. SRAM and SDRAM memory controllers were attached to the processor through SOPC Builder to access the memory chips. The Cyclone II FPGA does not support partial reconfiguration (Cyclone V does); therefore we could not incorporate run-time reconfiguration in the system. In particular we could not implement the decoder and memory as run-time reconfigurable devices; instead they were implemented as static devices. Also due to the low density of the Cyclone II device (in terms of logic and routing resources) and non-availability of multiport memory on the DE-2 board we did not implement the message pre-processor. However, the system components implemented (hashing processor, Blake peripheral with a static decoder and memory) were sufficient to examine the operation of the system and evaluate its performance. We recommend that the full system implementation be carried out in future works.

5.2 Software implementation

The software for the hashing processor was developed using the Nios II Build Tools for Eclipse CAD tool. This CAD tool allows the user to write C language code and download it to a selected processor in the FPGA. If there are multiple processors implemented in the FPGA, they can be individually selected and programmed with the Nios II Build tools. The Nios II Build tool creates a Board Support Package (BSP) application which includes a system header file. The system header file contains all the memory mapped addresses of the peripherals attached to processor. Through the use of pointers in the C- language, any peripherals can be accessed for both read and write operations. Interrupts can be detected when they are registered and enabled by special Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) functions. Interrupt Service Routines (ISRs) can be created to execute specific instructions at the occurrence of interrupts. The hashing processor's program includes a function to write message blocks to the Blake peripheral using pointers and an ISR to read hash codes (or chain values) from the peripheral (also using pointers). ANSI- C library functions such as printf, scanf can also be utilized; the Nios II Build tools communicate with the processor in the FPGA through a JTAG-UART port. Thus, the processor can read data entered by the user through the scanf function and also print out results obtained to the Nios II console using the printf function.

5.3 Testing procedure

After compilation of the design with the Quartus II CAD tool, it was tested with a testbench written in VHDL. The Modelsim-Altera simulation CAD tool provided by Mentor Graphics was used to carry out the tests. Modelsim-Altera contains pre-compiled Altera libraries which enable the timing/ propagation delays present in a particular FPGA device to be

accurately depicted by the Simulator when a timing simulation is run. The EDA Netlist Writer tool in Altera's Quartus II produces simulation model files with a .vho extension suitable for timing simulation. The testbench contained VHDL code for instantiating the design and applying stimuli to it. The stimuli consist of clock and reset signals, read enable signal, write enable signal and message blocks. Other stimuli are the initial values, the salt (which was set to 0) and the counter values. Modelsim-Altera compiles the testbench and all relevant design files into the simulator's machine language. The machine language code is loaded into the simulation engine and then the simulation is run.

The testbench was used to verify the functionality of the hash function by applying the same message block, initial value and counter value used in the 'intermediate values' section of the Blake submission document and comparing the output obtained with the output given in the submission document. The outputs were found to be the same; thus the functionality of the system was verified. Next, stimuli were applied to evaluate the performance of the system. The stimuli consist of messages without any common message blocks and messages with varying numbers of common message blocks. The tests were carried out on both the original Blake design and the proposed design. The results obtained are provided in the next section.

Apart from tests with the simulator, the design was also downloaded into the FPGA using the programmer tool of the Quartus II software package. The program written for the hashing processor was downloaded into the processor using the Nios II Build tools for Eclipse and the system was tested through the "Run as Nios II hardware" command of the Nios II Build tools. Observation of the output (hash code) printed on the Nios II console and the time taken to obtain the output (using an interval timer) showed that the proposed design generates the correct hash codes and achieves higher speed performance over the original Blake design when common message blocks are encountered.

5.4 Results

Table 6 and 7 give the performance analysis of the system as obtained from the Modelsim-Altera simulation. The results are also displayed graphically in figures 14, 15, 16, 17. In the upper section of table 6, the performance analysis for a single message with 10 message blocks is presented. Specifically, the times taken to hash the message when they are various numbers of common message blocks are presented for both the original Blake design and the proposed design. It is evident from these results that as the number of common message blocks increases, the proposed design achieves greater speed performance compared to the original design. The time savings were obtained by computing the difference between the time taken by the original design and the time taken by the proposed design and then expressing this as a percentage. The average (arithmetic mean) of these time savings was also computed.

# of messages = 1; # of blocks per message = 10; # of common blocks = k										
# of common blocks k	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Time_{Original} (μs)	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Time_{Proposed} (μs)	28	27.3	26.6	25.9	25.2	24.5	23.8	23.1	22.4	21.7
Time savings (%)	0	2.5	5.0	7.5	10.0	12.5	15.0	17.5	20.0	22.5
Average Time Saving (%)						12.5				
# of messages = k; # of common blocks = 1; # of blocks per message = 10										
# of messages k	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Time_{Original} (μs)	28	56	84	112	140	168	196	224	252	280
Time_{Proposed} (μs)	27.3	54.6	81.9	109.2	136.5	163.8	191.1	218.4	245.7	273.0
Time savings (%)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Average Time Saving (%)						2.5				

Table 6 Results (1)

In the lower section of table 6, the performance analysis for messages with one common message block is presented. This analysis shows how the time taken to hash an increasing number of messages (all containing one common message block) varies for both the original design and the proposed design. As observed from the table, when the number of messages increases, the difference in time taken by the original and proposed design also increases; thus, for a large number of messages, the proposed design utilizes a significantly smaller amount of time compared to the original design (however, the percentage difference is constant). Table 7 shows the results obtained when the number of common blocks is changed from 1 to 5 and then to 9; while still using the same number of messages, k , and the same number of blocks per messages as in the lower section table 6.

# of messages = k; # of common blocks = 5; # of blocks per message = 10										
# of messages k	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Time_{Original} (μs)	28	56	84	112	140	168	196	224	252	280
Time_{Proposed} (μs)	24.5	49.0	73.5	98.0	122.5	147.0	171.5	196.0	220.5	245.0
Time savings (%)	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.5
Average Time Saving (%)						12.5				
# of messages = k; # of common blocks =9; # of blocks per message = 10										
# of messages k	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Time_{Original} (μs)	28	56	84	112	140	168	196	224	252	280
Time_{Proposed} (μs)	21.7	43.4	65.1	86.8	108.5	130.2	151.9	173.6	195.3	217.0
Time savings (%)	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5	22.5
Average Time Saving (%)						22.5				

Table 7 Results (2)




Figure 14 Time to hash versus # of common blocks k in original and proposed designs




Figure 15 Time to hash versus # of messages k with 1 common block per message




Figure 16 Time to hash versus # of messages k with 5 common blocks per message




Figure 17 Time to hash versus # of messages k with 9 common blocks per message

CHAPTER 6

6. Conclusion and future work

6.1 Conclusion

In this thesis, high speed FPGA implementation of hash functions was explored using the Blake hash function, one of the SHA-3 candidates. A new design for the Blake hash function which incorporates the ability to recognize common message blocks, store the hash codes of the common message blocks in memory and skip the computation of the hash codes of these blocks when they are subsequently encountered was proposed. From the performance analysis of the proposed design, it is evident that the speed of the Blake hash function can be improved by the proposed design. The higher speed performance comes into play when common message blocks are encountered in the messages being hashed. When there are no common message blocks, the proposed design operates at the same speed as the original Blake design. The speed improvement becomes more significant when a large number of messages with common message blocks are hashed.

6.2 Future work

The system implemented in this work did not include the message preprocessor and the run-time reconfigurable decoder and memory (the decoder and memory were implemented as static devices). Future implementations can include these components.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- [1] M. Bellare, R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk, "Keying hash functions for message authentication," in *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '96*, N. Koblitz, Ed: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1996, pp. 1-15.
- [2] J. Black, S. Halevi, H. Krawczyk, T. Krovetz and P. Rogaway, "UMAC: fast and secure message authentication," in *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 99*, M. Wiener, Ed: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1999, pp. 79-79.
- [3] P.W. Wong and N. Memon, "Secret and public key image watermarking schemes for image authentication and ownership verification," *Image Processing, IEEE Transactions on*, vol. 10, no. 10, pp. 1593-1601 2001.
- [4] J.P. Aumasson, L. Henzen, M. Willi and C.W.R. Phan, *SHA-3 Proposal BLAKE*, January 11, 2011. Available: <http://www.131002.net/blake/> [Accessed: August 2011].
- [5] S. Tillich, M. Feldhofer, M. Kirschbaum, T. Plos, J.M. Schmidt and A. Szekely, "High-speed hardware implementations of BLAKE, Blue Midnight Wish, CubeHash, ECHO, Fugue, Groestl, Hamsi, JH, Keccak, Luffa, Shabal, SHAvite-3, SIMD, and Skein", *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, report 2009/510 2009.
- [6] L. Jianzhou and R. Karri, "Compact hardware architectures for BLAKE and LAKE hash functions," in *Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Proceedings of 2010 IEEE International Symposium on*, 2010, pp. 2107-2110.
- [7] I. Damgard, "A design principle for hash functions," in *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO' 89 Proceedings*, G. Brassard, Ed: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1990, pp. 416-427.

- [8] H. Dobbertin, "Cryptanalysis of MD4," in *Fast Software Encryption 1996 Proceedings*, volume 1039 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, D. Gollmann, Ed: Springer, 1996, pp. 53–69.
- [9] X. Wang, H. Yu and Y. L. Yin, "Efficient collision search attacks on SHA-0," in *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005 Proceedings*, volume 3621 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V. Shoup, Ed: Springer, 2005, pp. 1–16.
- [10] X. Wang, Y. L. Yin and H. Yu, "Finding collisions in the full SHA-1," in *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005 Proceedings*, volume 3621 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V. Shoup, Ed: Springer, 2005, pp. 17–36.
- [11] E. Biham and O. Dunkelman, "A Framework for iterative hash functions — HAIFA," presented at the 2nd NIST hash function workshop, Santa Barbara, 2006.
- [12] S. Lucks, "A failure-friendly design principle for hash functions," in *Advances in Cryptology -ASIACRYPT 2005 Proceedings*, volume 3788 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, B. Roy, Ed: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 474–494.
- [13] B. Baldwin, A. Byrne, M. Hamilton, N. Hanley, R.P. McEvoy, W. Pan and W.P. Marnane, "FPGA Implementations of SHA-3 Candidates: CubeHash, Groestl, LANE, Shabal and Spectral Hash," in *Digital System Design, Architectures, Methods and Tools, 2009. DSD '09. 12th Euromicro Conference on*, 2009, pp. 783-790.
- [14] B. Baldwin, A. Byrne, Liang Lu, M. Hamilton, N. Hanley, M. O'Neill and W.P. Marnane, "FPGA Implementations of the Round Two SHA-3 Candidates," in *Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), 2010 International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 400-407.
- [15] B. Baldwin, A. Byrne, L. Lu, M. Hamilton, N. Hanley, M. O'Neill and W.P. Marnane, "A hardware wrapper for the SHA-3 hash algorithms," in *Signals and Systems Conference (ISSC 2010), IET Irish*, 2010, pp. 1-6.

- [16] J. Beuchat, E. Okamoto and T. Yamazaki, "Compact implementations of BLAKE-32 and BLAKE-64 on FPGA," in *Field-Programmable Technology (FPT), 2010 International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 170-177.
- [17] S. Eiroa and I. Baturone, "Hardware authentication based on PUFs and SHA-3 2nd round candidates," in *Microelectronics (ICM), 2010 International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 319-322.
- [18] M. El-Hadedy, M. Margala, D. Gligoroski and S.J. Knapkog, "Implementing the Blue Midnight Wish Hash Function on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA Platform," in *Reconfigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig), 2010 International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 394-399.
- [19] L. Henzen, J.-. Aumasson, W. Meier and R.C.-. Phan, "VLSI characterization of the cryptographic hash function BLAKE," *Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on*, vol. 19, no. 10, pp. 1746-1754 2011.
- [20] P. Kitsos and N. Sklavos, "On the hardware implementation efficiency of SHA-3 candidates," in *Electronics, Circuits, and Systems (ICECS), 2010 17th IEEE International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 1240-1243.
- [21] M. Knezevic, K. Kobayashi, J. Ikegami, S. Matsuo, A. Satoh, U. Kocabas, J. Fan, T. Katashita, T. Sugawara, K. Sakiyama, I. Verbauwhede, K. Ohta, N. Homma and T. Aoki, "Fair and consistent hardware evaluation of fourteen round two SHA-3 candidates," *Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, IEEE Transactions on*, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1-13 2011.
- [22] K. Kobayashi, J. Ikegami, M. Knezevic, E.X. Guo, S. Matsuo, S. Huang, L. Nazhandali, U. Kocabas, J. Fan, A. Satoh, I. Verbauwhede, K. Sakiyama and K. Ohta, "Prototyping platform for performance evaluation of SHA-3 candidates," in *Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2010 IEEE International Symposium on*, 2010, pp. 60-63.

- [23] L. Han and B. Guoqiang, "Hardware implementation analysis of SHA-3 candidates algorithms," in *Solid-State and Integrated Circuit Technology (ICSICT), 2010 10th IEEE International Conference on*, 2010, pp. 266-268.
- [24] A.H. Namin and M.A. Hasan, "Implementation of the compression function for selected SHA-3 candidates on FPGA," in *Parallel & Distributed Processing, Workshops and Phd Forum (IPDPSW), 2010 IEEE International Symposium on*, 2010, pp. 1-4.
- [25] A.H. Namin, G. Li, J. Wu, J. Xu, Y. Huang, O. Nam, R. Elbaz and M.A. Hasan, "FPGA implementation of CubeHash, Grostel, JH, and SHAvite-3 hash functions," in *NEWCAS Conference (NEWCAS), 2010 8th IEEE International*, 2010, pp. 121-124.
- [26] N. Sklavos and P. Kitsos, "BLAKE HASH Function Family on FPGA: From the Fastest to the Smallest," in *VLSI (ISVLSI), 2010 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on*, 2010, pp. 139-142.
- [27] X. Gao, J. Wang, H. Ou and X. Li, "RAM-Based Reconfigurable Implementation of the MD6 Hash Function," in *Embedded Software and Systems, 2009. ICESS '09. International Conference on*, 2009, pp. 27-31.
- [28] Z. Chen, X. Guo, A. Sinha and P. Schaumont, "Data-oriented performance analysis of SHA-3 candidates on FPGA accelerated computers," in *Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2011*, 2011, pp. 1-6.

VITA AUCTORIS

Olakunle Esuruoso was born in 1980 in Nigeria. He received his Bachelor of Engineering degree from the University of East London in 2009. He is currently a candidate for the Master of Applied Science Degree in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Windsor and hopes to graduate in Fall 2011.